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An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance: 
Why Is China Exceeding International 
Banking Standards? 
Peter KNAACK 
Abstract: As a G20 member, China has been engaged in financial 
reform since the end of the global financial crisis. A core piece of this 
reform is Basel III, the new prudential standard issued by the Basel 
Committee. Rather than being merely compliant, China’s banking 
regulation is stricter than the global standard and being implemented 
ahead of the international timetable. Why is China voluntarily subject-
ing itself to tougher regulatory standards than the rest of the world? 
This article shows that low adjustment costs, factional politics, and, 
above all, an unusual alignment of domestic interests in the quest for 
international reputation are driving this phenomenon. The troubled 
institutional history of China’s financial system motivates all relevant 
stakeholders to seek external validation in order to address a credibil-
ity gap abroad, albeit for different reasons. The article examines the 
power of reputation as a driver of regulatory positioning in the con-
text of China’s integration into international financial institutions. 
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Introduction 
China’s rise in recent years has triggered a lively debate on the impact 
of its emergence as a major power in the international system. Largely 
ostracised in the first post-war decades until the West changed course 
in the 1970s, the People’s Republic is a relative newcomer to the 
institutions of global economic governance. Its integration into the 
global trade regime at the turn of the century has received much 
scholarly attention. In the realm of global financial governance, how-
ever, China’s integration as a key stakeholder is more recent and less 
understood.  
In the wake of the global financial crisis, China gained access to 
the Basel Committee and other global standard-setting bodies, along 
with all other developing country members of the Group of 20 
(G20). Drawing lessons from the crisis, the Basel Committee devel-
oped a new global prudential banking standard, Basel III. All member 
countries are expected to comply with the new standard, even though 
implementation entails significant adjustment costs for both banks 
and regulatory agencies. Basel III implementation in China demands 
attention: a new set of domestic prudential banking rules does not 
merely comply with the Basel regulation; instead, it stipulates capital 
requirements for banks that are more stringent than the global stand-
ard, encompasses a wider range of rules, and sets out a faster imple-
mentation schedule. China is thus exceeding Basel III, a practice that 
is called alternatively super-equivalence, over-compliance, or gold-
plating, each with its own connotations. 
Why is China, an emerging market economy with a largely under-
developed financial system and a per capita income much below the 
OECD average, voluntarily subjecting itself to tougher financial 
standards than the rest of the world? This article presents two an-
swers to this question. First, it situates prudential banking regulation 
in a context of low adjustment costs and a domestic factional struggle 
over credit growth. Over-compliance with Basel III helps the techno-
cratic faction of Chinese policymakers reassert control over the bank-
ing system after the massive expansion of policy lending in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. Second, it argues that key stakeholders in 
China seek reputation to overcome an international credibility gap in 
financial prudential supervision. The troubled institutional history of 
China’s financial system motivates relevant stakeholders, regulators, 
and the industry to seek external validation of soundness and credibil-
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ity, albeit for different reasons. Specifically, banks need reputation to 
expand abroad, and regulators need reputation to enhance their nego-
tiating position both internationally and domestically. Thus, in the 
search for international reputation, the interests of banks and regula-
tors are aligned. It is this peculiar convergence of outward-oriented 
incentives on both the state and industry side that helps explain why 
China decided to over-comply with Basel III banking standards. 
The remainder of this article1 starts with a review of the key de-
bate on China’s position in the political economy of global financial 
governance. It then draws on the literature on policy diffusion, epi-
stemic communities, and government networks to identify the condi-
tions of reputation as a driver of compliance in global financial stand-
ard-setting bodies. An introduction to the Basel Accords on banking 
regulation is followed by a brief history of China’s development in 
this area. As a consequence of financial reform in the early 2000s and 
the privileged position of banks in the domestic system of financial 
repression, adjustment costs for adherence to Basel III are relatively 
low. The article then presents two complementary explanations for 
the country’s decision to over-comply with Basel III standards. First, 
in the wake of the massive credit expansion triggered by the 2008/ 
2009 stimulus programme, the technocratic faction of China’s policy-
making elite can use gold-plated Basel III standards as an instrument 
to reign in the generalist faction, lock in banking reform, and control 
future credit growth. Second, because China’s banks lack a track rec-
ord as well-governed corporations in the marketplace, they need to 
rely on international standards as the reputational basis for future 
regional and global expansion. Mere compliance with Basel III would 
be insufficient to overcome the credibility gap that Chinese banks are 
facing abroad. In addition, promotion of and adherence to strict fi-
nancial standards can be an instrument for Chinese regulators to 
attain status and prestige both in international regulatory bodies and 
at home. A concluding section considers caveats of the argument 
presented and avenues for further research. 
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1 This research was made possible with kind support from the China Scholarship 
Council and the USC US-China Institute. I am grateful to my colleagues at 
USC and the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, for very 
helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article. Mistakes and errors remain 
my responsibility. 
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China in International Financial Institutions 
China is a latecomer to the liberal economic world order. It shares a 
state capitalist model with other East Asian late developers that com-
bines bottom-up entrepreneurial private capital accumulation with 
state control over strategic industries, in particular finance. At the 
same time, Sino-capitalism is different in that it has emerged in a 
highly globalised environment. China has absorbed Western liberal 
institutions more profoundly than its East Asian peers did at compar-
able development stages (Callahan 2015; McNally 2012; Otero-
Iglesias and Vermeiren 2015). The conditions of World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO) accession in 2001 and China’s near-perfect compli-
ance record with decisions made by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) since then are telling examples in the trade regime 
(Zhang and Li 2014). In the world of global finance, much scholarly 
work to date has focused on the country’s positioning in the Bretton 
Woods institutions whereas questions of compliance with global 
financial standards have received little attention. 
The rules that govern global finance are negotiated in global 
standard-setting bodies such as the Basel Committee and the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions. Created in the 1970s 
and 1980s as government networks, these organisations exist outside 
the purview of international public law and their decisions are not 
legally binding. Instead, member agencies agree on a global standard 
by consensus and then proceed with domestic implementation unilat-
erally (Slaughter 2004). Until the global financial crisis, financial 
standard-setting bodies were rather exclusive clubs, confined to regu-
lators from advanced economies. Even in the wake of the crisis, lead-
ing powers successfully resisted attempts to make the United Nations 
a relevant forum for global economic issues (Knaack and Katada 
2013). Nevertheless, they widened the perimeter of involved stake-
holders, granting membership in financial standard-setting bodies to 
all G20 nations, including developing countries such as China and 
India (Kahler 2013). Thus, the current agreement on prudential bank-
ing supervision (Basel III) was the first global financial standard de-
veloped with China at the negotiation table. Over the last eight years, 
Chinese regulators have participated in trans-governmental delibera-
tions, but analysts who expected that Beijing would exert influence or 
resist the global standard-setting process were proven wrong. 
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This is because participation is not synonymous with influence. 
The literature on the political economy of global regulatory govern-
ance identifies two sources of power: market size and expertise. In 
the field of financial regulation in particular, scholars have highlighted 
the leading role of dominant financial centres in global standard set-
ting (Simmons 2001; Oatley and Nabors 1998; Posner 2009; Singer 
2007). Drezner (2007, 2010) argues that market size determines the 
balance between rewards and costs of adjustment and thus the state 
incentive to engage in global harmonisation of regulatory standards. 
In his eyes, China has already become a great power whose economic 
interests diverge clearly from those of the developed core countries. 
As a consequence, the likely outcomes of current global regulatory 
reform are either rival standards, where the great powers each pro-
mote their own regulatory settings, or sham standards, which are 
promoted by international institutions but lack enforcement. There is 
indeed evidence that Chinese authorities have sought to influence 
international standard setting in non-financial sectors by leveraging the 
size of China’s domestic market (Bach, Newman, and Weber 2006).  
A second approach to global regulatory politics builds on histor-
ical institutionalism to highlight the importance of regulatory capacity 
and expertise (Bach and Newman 2007). According to this perspec-
tive, economies with a longer track record of supervision and a more 
complex regulatory architecture are expected to lead global regulatory 
deliberations, thus wielding significant influence over the standard-
setting process (Baker 2009; Farrell and Newman 2010; Raustiala 
2002; Slaughter 2004; Tsingou 2010). 
As Kempthorne (2015) rightly points out, in the realm of finan-
cial regulation China currently commands neither of these sources of 
power enough to be considered a leading jurisdiction. The small size 
and low degree of cross-border interconnectedness of China’s finan-
cial market stands in stark contrast to its position in the global trade 
system. And China’s financial supervisors have not yet accumulated 
regulatory experience and capacity equivalent to that of their col-
leagues from advanced economies (Walter 2016). As a consequence, 
and contrary to expectations that the inclusion of emerging market 
economies would lead to tension in global financial governance, the 
newcomers have largely supported the post-crisis regulatory reform 
agenda (Kahler 2013; Ren 2012; Véron 2016). 
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This article draws two lessons from current scholarship in this 
field. First, it acknowledges the relevance of key structural and institu-
tional features for the Chinese case. Market size and the uneven dis-
tribution of cross-border banking activity matter. As long as the epi-
centre of global financial markets continues to be the United States 
and Western Europe, we cannot expect China to rise from rule-taker 
to first mover. Moreover, this study concurs with Drezner’s claim 
that market size and adjustment costs interact to condition the do-
mestic political economy of standards adoption. As this article will 
demonstrate, the fortunate financial position of Chinese banks at the 
time when Basel III was issued meant they were facing relatively neg-
ligible adjustment costs. These structural and institutional features 
provide the context for an analysis of the interaction of domestic key 
players that owes much to historical-institutionalist scholarship. This 
article will argue that Basel III was of instrumental value in a domes-
tic struggle between two factions in China’s financial and economic 
policy establishment. 
Second, the Chinese case also reveals a lacuna in the state of the 
art in international regulatory politics. While the theoretical ap-
proaches discussed above provide inferential leverage to explain Chi-
na’s lack of resistance to regulatory harmonisation, they do not con-
template the possibility of China exceeding global regulatory stand-
ards. This is because the power of reputation has not received 
enough attention in this debate.  
Reputation in Global Financial Regulation 
Any reductionist approach that conceives of state behaviour as mere-
ly a function of domestic variables ignores a key element of interna-
tional relations: governments respond to inputs from abroad, learn 
from each other, and continuously negotiate the rules that undergird 
the international system (Oatley 2011; Buzan 2004; Meyer et al. 1997). 
The diffusion of policies across borders can be driven by economic 
competition, promotion by dominant actors, learning, or social emu-
lation. These four channels of policy diffusion often overlap in the 
empirical world (Brooks and Kurtz 2012; Elkins and Simmons 2005; 
Linos 2011; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008; Weyland 2007). 
The social aspects of policy diffusion – that is, learning and emulation – 
are particularly pronounced in areas where policymakers are able to 
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interact frequently as members of the same international organisation, 
government network, or epistemic community (Bearce and Bon-
danella 2007; Bach and Newman 2010; Chwieroth 2007; Gandrud 
2013; Cao 2012). Newcomers are especially susceptible to socialisa-
tion influences, at both the individual and the state level (Johnston 
2008). 
A key driver of policy emulation within such organisations is the 
search for reputation – that is, peer recognition and status (Simmons, 
Dobbin, and Garrett 2008; Meseguer and Gilardi 2009). The domes-
tic implementation of a global standard promises to endow a jurisdic-
tion with a certain degree of such recognition. But reputational bene-
fits do not end here. Issuing regulation that is super-equivalent to the 
standards that carry global legitimacy provides states with more repu-
tation than mere implementation does. Such over-compliance has 
both tangible and intangible benefits, and policymakers are aware of 
both. 
In the realm of banking regulation, the tangible benefits of repu-
tation are especially pronounced. Simmons (2001) points out that 
capital adequacy rules provide market participants with information 
about the soundness of a financial institution. Investors and share-
holders reward companies that comply (or over-comply) with regula-
tory standards, and investment analysts and rating agencies provide 
better risk assessments for them. Risk is factored into the price of 
capital in financial markets, and therefore financial institutions that 
adhere to prudential standards enjoy access to cheaper capital (Brum-
mer 2010).  
In addition, the reputation derived from compliance with bank-
ing standards may be an essential requirement for banks from emerg-
ing market economies to expand overseas. When regulators from 
Basel Committee member states receive requests from banks head-
quartered in non-Basel countries to enter their domestic market, they 
are explicitly required to review the regulatory regime of the home-
country supervisor. Only if and when the regulator deems prudential 
regulation equivalent will he or she grant the licence for the applicant 
bank to operate in his or her jurisdiction. This reputational mechan-
ism has been found to play a decisive role in the adoption of Basel I 
standards (Ho 2002; Chey 2007; Alexander, Dhumale, and Eatwell 
2006). The situation is unlikely to be different for the current set of 
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Basel standards. In a speech on the reasons for India’s Basel imple-
mentation, the executive director of the Reserve Bank of India stated:  
The “perception” of a lower-standard regulatory regime will put 
Indian banks at a disadvantage in global competition, especially 
because the implementation of Basel III is subject to a “peer 
group” review whose findings will be in the public domain. 
(Vishwanathan 2015: 2) 
To date, India and China are the only developing countries that have 
“gold-plated” Basel III – that is, they decided to issue prudential 
banking rules that are stricter than the global standard (IMF 2014; 
Reserve Bank of India 2014; Sekine 2011; Walter 2014). The political 
economy of India’s decision to issue super-equivalent regulation is 
beyond the scope of this research, although it certainly merits schol-
arly attention. Regarding China, this article argues that over-compli-
ance with Basel III was necessary to address a credibility gap abroad. 
For reasons that the following sections will identify, mere compliance 
with the global standard likely would not have endowed Chinese 
banks and their regulators with enough reputation among their peers 
in global finance. This causal mechanism operates at the international 
level, but it cannot be isolated from the domestic political economy 
of banking. As this article will show, strict implementation of Basel 
III took place in the context of a domestic factional struggle over 
credit expansion in the wake of the crisis. 
The arguments developed in this article rely on two main sources 
of information. The first is extensive archival research that includes 
public reports by national and global regulatory agencies and the 
financial press. Furthermore, the article benefits from access to in-
ternal journals published by the State Council Development Research 
Center and the Central Bank’s Research Institute that reveal internal 
discussions among Chinese policymakers. Second, the findings from 
archival research were corroborated in on-site interviews with 12 
financial regulators in China, Hong Kong SAR, the United States, and 
the European Union between 2012 and 2015. 
The Basel Accords 
Facing serious disturbances in the international currency and banking 
markets, financial supervisors and central bankers from 10 developed 
economies (the so-called G10) met in the Swiss town of Basel in 
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1974. They agreed to establish a committee in order to institutionalise 
transnational cooperation in the field of banking supervision, thereby 
creating one of the first government networks (Slaughter 2004). The 
Basel Committee published its first Accord in 1988 and released Basel 
II in 2004. In the wake of the 2007–2009 financial turmoil, the G20 
mandated the Basel Committee to build on the lessons learned from 
the crisis to establish a new set of regulatory standards.  
The Basel III capital requirements, finalised in 2010, are more 
comprehensive and stricter than their predecessors. In addition to a 
wider definition of assets and a more stringent one of capital, Basel 
III raises the minimum standards for capital as a percentage of risk-
weighted assets. Banks must hold highly loss-absorbing (Common 
Equity Tier 1) capital equivalent to 7 per cent of risk-weighted assets, 
up from 2 per cent under Basel II. This risk-based capital measure is 
complemented by a new leverage ratio that requires banks to hold 
Tier 1 capital equivalent to 3 per cent of total unweighted assets 
(BCBS 2011; BIS 2012). 
China and Basel III 
China was largely isolated from the global economy until the late 
1970s. After three decades of Maoist planned economy and a decade 
of Cultural Revolution, the flow of capital was almost completely 
under the direct control of the central government, and banks merely 
served as accounting institutions. In October 1979, one year after 
embarking on the path of economic reform, Deng Xiaoping declared 
that “we must turn the banks into real banks” (Qiao, Su, and Zhang 
2010: 73). When the first Basel Accord was released in 1988, China’s 
financial system barely had “real banks,” and the central bank had 
existed for a mere four years. A commercial banking law was not in 
place until 1995. It is thus not surprising that domestic authorities did 
not engage with Basel standards until 2003. One of the first acts of 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), created in 2003, 
was to implement Basel I standards domestically (Rana 2012). As for 
Basel II, a CBRC statement from 2007 reads:  
Obviously, it is a gradual and long-term course to meet all the 
standards; therefore, banks must, based on their own situation, 
make an overall plan and gradually meet the Basel II standards in a 
phased, well-sequenced manner. (CBRC 2007)  
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Since China joined the Basel Committee in 2009 it has changed its 
position significantly. The country is evolving from laggard to primus 
inter pares in financial regulation. China’s new banking standards are 
not only stricter than Basel III, they were implemented ahead of the 
internationally agreed schedule. 
In October 2009, the CBRC published a notification entitled 
“On improving the commercial bank capital replenishment mechan-
ism,” preparing banks for recapitalisation in line with expected higher 
capital requirements. In June 2011, half a year after the Basel III 
standards were published, the CBRC released the “Commercial Bank 
Leverage Ratio Management Method.” After circulating consultation 
papers in April 2012, the CBRC followed up with the “Capital Rules 
for Commercial Banks,” approved by the State Council in June 2012. 
All relevant rules for the domestic implementation of Basel III were 
thus published ahead of the Financial Stability Board (FSB)-mandated 
deadline of end of 2012 (State Council Development Research Center 
2013e). 
A striking feature of China’s implementation of Basel III is that 
the domestic rules are stricter than the international standards in sev-
eral categories. The following three super-equivalent rules stand out: 
(1) Basel III raised the common equity capital ratio from 2 per cent to 
7 per cent, but China’s minimum ratio is set at 7.5 per cent. Domestic 
systemically important banks (D-SIB) face a capital requirement of 
8.5 per cent. (2) Chinese authorities require a leverage ratio that is one 
percentage point higher than the international standard. (3) China’s 
regulators do not impose a fixed provisions rate or coverage rate on 
banks. However, they promote a model of dynamic provisions regu-
lation with the goal of loan-loss provisions equal to 2.5 per cent of 
total loans, and a 150 per cent coverage rate of these loans. By con-
trast, Basel III refrains from setting any specific standard in this area. 
Instead, the Basel Committee merely states that it is “addressing in-
centives to stronger provisioning in the regulatory capital framework” 
(BCBS 2011: 6). 
The Basel Committee’s new peer-review programme examined 
China’s implementation of Basel III in 2013. The committee gave 
Chinese regulators the best possible overall grade of “compliant” and 
duly noted a total of 17 points where China is gold-plating Basel III 
standards (BCBS 2013b). Even this long list is incomplete, because it 
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fails to incorporate the above-mentioned leverage ratio and provi-
sioning rules.  
Table 1. Basel Standards and Domestic Implementation in China  
(Selection) 
Regulatory Standard Basel II Basel III China 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 2 7 7.5 
Leverage Ratio n/a 3 4 
Provisions Rate  n/a n/a 2.5% 
Provisions Coverage Rate n/a n/a 150% 
Source: People’s Bank of China Research Institute 2012b. 
In addition to stricter regulatory standards, China also committed to a 
tighter implementation schedule. Basel III is scheduled to be gradual-
ly phased in between the beginning of 2013 and the end of 2018. 
Beijing originally envisioned the phase-in to start a year ahead of 
every other country, in 2012, but later recognised that this was overly 
ambitious (Rabinovitch 2012). Nevertheless, the Chinese schedule 
stipulates full compliance by the end of 2016, two years before the 
global deadline. Beijing further beat the international standard setters 
by implementing the 4 per cent leverage ratio in 2012 (BCBS 2013a; 
BIS and BCBS 2013; PBOC Research Institute 2012b). 
However, China is not the only country that is gold-plating Basel 
standards. Currently, nine jurisdictions have issued rules that exceed 
Basel III, including Sweden, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the heart-
land of banking, which applies a so-called “Swiss Finish.” Almost all 
of them are high-income countries with fully developed financial 
markets that can rather easily afford gold-plating. Besides China, 
India is the only exception to this pattern. 
In sum, China is establishing a system of prudential banking regu-
lation that is stricter than the international standards, and it is imple-
menting it faster than anybody else. Why is China, an emerging mar-
ket economy with a per capita income much below the OECD aver-
age and a largely underdeveloped financial system, voluntarily subject-
ing itself to tougher financial standards than the rest of the world? 
The remainder of this article presents two answers to this ques-
tion. It shows that a domestic factional struggle over credit expansion 
  52 Peter Knaack 

and the perceived need to overcome an international credibility gap 
are driving China’s efforts to exceed global banking standards. 
The Context: Low Adjustment Costs for Banks 
Adherence to stricter capital adequacy requirements entails costs for 
banks, and in the case of Basel III, these costs might be considerable. 
The Institute of International Finance (IIF), a bank lobby organisa-
tion, produced a study showing that the implementation of Basel III 
would strangulate credit expansion, thus slowing global GDP growth 
by more than three percentage points (IIF 2011). Recently, the as-
sumptions underlying this and similar studies have been fundamental-
ly questioned by Admati and Hellwig (2013; Modigliani and Miller 
1958). In principle there is no risk-adjusted cost difference between 
equity and debt financing for any firm, but the authors themselves 
recognise that subsidies, signalling effects, and “market imperfec-
tions” mean that meeting higher capital requirements is a costly en-
deavour for financial firms. Similarly, econometric studies undertaken 
by regulatory agencies and a variety of scholars indicate that even 
though the estimates of the bank lobby are exaggerated, higher capital 
requirements will indeed raise the cost of lending as banks pass on 
higher financing costs to their clients (Allen et al. 2012; BCBS 2010; 
Elliott 2009; Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson 2010). 
While higher capital requirements affect banks in all jurisdictions, 
some are harder hit than others. In comparison to their Western 
competitors, China’s banks have a balance-sheet composition and 
income structure that greatly reduces their adjustment costs at this 
point in time. 
Since its re-emergence in the 1980s, China’s financial system has 
withstood two crises. The reform process that took place in the 
period between those two crises helps explain why China’s banks 
today are in a different position than their Western competitors. The 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 revealed that years of “policy lending” 
and “relationship lending” had led to the accumulation of massive 
amounts of non-performing loans (NPL) on the banks’ balance 
sheets (Goodstadt 2011; Zhou 2007). In response, state authorities 
had to prop up banks with considerable capital injections twice, in 
1998 and 2003 (Walter and Howie 2011; Yi 2009).  
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In addition to these measures, the authorities promoted corpor-
ate governance reform of the state-owned banks and prepared them 
for listing on the stock market. The four big banks went public in 
2005, 2006, and 2010, raising between 13 and 22 billion dollars each 
for a total of USD 74 billion on the stock markets of Shanghai and 
Hong Kong (Borst 2013). Thus, the structure and timing of domestic 
banking reform left China’s big banks flush with capital as the global 
financial crisis approached (Ba 2010; Qiao, Su, and Zhang 2010).  
According to the IMF’s Financial System Stability Assessment, 
Tier 1 capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets for China’s big-
gest 17 banks increased from 6 per cent in 2007 to 9.6 per cent in 
2010, with an equity-to-asset ratio of 6 per cent, which exceeded both 
Basel and gold-plated Chinese leverage ratio standards. Furthermore, 
loan-loss provisions jumped from 118 per cent of non-performing 
loans in 2008 to 218 per cent in 2010 (IMF 2011). Whereas Western 
banks have pressured regulators to grant them a transition phase until 
the end of 2018, China’s banks had already met all Basel III capital 
requirements by September 2012 (OECD 2013; Zou 2013). 
In addition to state-sponsored recapitalisation and market-driven 
equity capital flows, China’s big banks benefit from their position in 
the domestic market, which guarantees a substantial net interest gap 
profit (Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2010). Chinese authorities have es-
tablished a system of financial repression that involves fixing the rates 
at which banks lend and take deposits, having provided domestic 
banks with an interest spread between 2.5 and 3.5 percentage points 
until 2009 and between 2 and 2.5 since then, whereas banks in the 
rest of the world must deal with a much less comfortable margin of 
approximately 1.45 on average (BIS 2012; PBOC Research Institute 
2012a, 2012c; Qiao, Su, and Zhang 2010). 
The Banker magazine revealed in its June 2013 report that the In-
dustrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) has become the 
world’s biggest bank in terms of Tier 1 capital, making it the first 
Chinese bank ever to gain that status. Furthermore, with double-digit 
net profit growth rates, China’s big four banks ranked among the top 
15 in profit as early as 2009. By 2013 they occupied the first four 
places in the profit ranking, accounting for about one-third of the 
world’s banking profits (The Banker 2013). Over the last half-decade, 
Chinese banks have been the only ones that have moved upwards in 
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the top-10 rankings, replacing Western banks such as JP Morgan 
Chase and Bank of America (Alexander 2014). 
Having weathered the global financial crisis without major losses, 
and being backed by a domestic financial arrangement that ensures 
substantial profits in an overall environment of continued economic 
expansion, China’s banks are in a good position to incur the adjust-
ment costs of adherence to Basel III standards. However, favourable 
conditions in China’s banking system merely represent an enabling 
factor for the country’s adherence to global prudential banking stand-
ards. In a country where domestic banks have a joint market share of 
almost 98 per cent, and where the major financial firms continue to 
be majority-owned by the state, dissenting voices are few. The com-
manding powers of the party-state obviate the kind of contentious or 
consultative relationship with the banking sector that plays a key role 
in financial regulatory policymaking in pluralist democracies. But it 
would be wrong to conceive of the Chinese state as a monolithic 
entity, as the following section will show. 
Table 2. Global Bank Ranking by Tier 1 Capital 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
1 BofA ICBC ICBC ICBC
2 JP Morgan JP Morgan CCB CCB
3 ICBC BofA JP Morgan JP Morgan
4 HSBC HSBC BofA BoC
5 Citigroup CCB HSBC BofA
6 CCB Citigroup Citigroup ABC
7 Mitsubishi Mitsubishi BoC Citigroup
8 Wells Fargo Wells Fargo Wells Fargo Wells Fargo
9 BoC BoC ABC HSBC
10 ABC ABC Mitsubishi Mitsubishi
Source: The Banker 2013. 
Note: ICBC – Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
CCB – China Construction Bank 
BoC – Bank of China 
ABC – Agricultural Bank of China 
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Factions and Finance in Post-Crisis China 
In order to understand the domestic political economy of financial 
policymaking in China, with its dense web of interdependency be-
tween state and party as well as private firms and public authorities, 
one must go beyond the Western prism of interest group politics. 
Shih (2008) introduces the notion of cyclical factional politics to pro-
vide a convincing explanation of financial sector development in 
China up until the global financial crisis. Over the last decades of 
reform and opening, a generalist faction interested in maximising 
local growth through accelerated lending and investment has strug-
gled with a technocratic faction that prioritises monetary and macro-
economic stability.  
The banking sector is at the centre of this battlefield of factional 
politics. Large banks not only play an essential role in the central 
bank’s exchange rate and macroeconomic management system, they 
have also been, at least until recently, the main source of capital for 
local investment. Throughout the early 2000s the technocratic faction 
can be credited with reforming state-owned banks, improving loan 
quality, and addressing inflationary pressures in a period of large bal-
ance-of-payment imbalances. Unlike its peers in advanced capitalist 
economies, the Chinese central bank has made use of prudential 
banking instruments to achieve these macroeconomic goals. It is in 
this context that Basel III emerges as another convenient instrument 
in the hands of the technocratic faction. 
Although it might be tempting to regard China’s development 
success as the consequence of a singular export-led growth model, in 
reality policymakers have constantly changed and adjusted macroeco-
nomic management in a trial-and-error fashion (Wu and Ma 2013). 
Until the late 1990s, China’s foreign exchange reserves were low, the 
current account was relatively balanced, and it can be argued that the 
value of the renminbi was close to market equilibrium. It was only after 
the Asian Financial Crisis that policymakers adopted a macroeco-
nomic management model that combined export promotion with 
foreign exchange reserve accumulation as a self-insurance policy 
against external shocks (Chin 2010; Lardy 2013; State Council Devel-
opment Research Center 2013d).  
China’s current account surplus rose from 1.3 per cent of GDP 
in 2001 to over 10 per cent in 2007, and its capital account also regis-
tered a constant surplus throughout the first decade of the 2000s. The 
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consequence of this inflow of capital, according to the Balassa–
Samuelson effect, is either nominal currency appreciation or inflation, 
both of which are highly undesirable for the authorities. Because 
China adopted a fixed exchange rate from 1998 to 2004 and let the 
renminbi appreciate only slowly before and after the global financial 
crisis, fighting inflation by controlling money supply growth has be-
come a formidable task for the authorities. 
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) adopted two methods to 
sterilise capital inflows: First, it issued bonds (CNY 4 trillion out-
standing in 2010) that domestic commercial banks would be obliged 
to buy in significant quantities. Second, it raised the portion of 
deposits that commercial banks must retain at the central bank. The 
required reserve ratio (RRR) rose from 6 per cent in September 2003 
to 15 per cent by the end of 2008 (China Finance 40 n.d.; Lardy 
2013). This approach stands in stark contrast to the constant and low 
or even non-existent RRR in most Western countries to date. In sum, 
banks were an essential wheel in the macroeconomic management 
mechanism of the technocratic faction, and prudential banking 
measures were part of its regulatory arsenal. 
The global financial crisis altered this situation drastically. Chi-
nese banks were not affected directly because of their limited expo-
sure to Western financial markets. However, China’s CNY 4 trillion 
(USD 586 billion) stimulus programme was channelled largely 
through the domestic banking system. In 2009, the total amount of 
outstanding renminbi loans expanded by 33 per cent and China’s 
credit-to-GDP ratio jumped from 197 per cent to 229 per cent (IMF 
2011; PBOC Research Institute 2013b; State Council Development 
Research Center 2013b). Observers qualified this move as a takeover 
by the generalist faction and a return to the policy-lending practices 
of the 1990s (Borst and Lardy 2015; Goodstadt 2011). Faced with the 
threat of a sharp economic contraction and the subsequent expected 
rise in unemployment and social unrest, the Communist Party opted 
for aggressive credit expansion even though this meant undoing years 
of improvement in domestic lending practices. 
That China sailed through the global financial crisis at an almost 
unabated speed of economic expansion was considered a success by 
policymakers in Beijing and abroad, but the technocratic faction had 
to reassert power in order to address the repercussions of the stimu-
lus programme. Fearing an overheating of the economy, it used all 
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available instruments to curb further credit growth. The Central Bank 
raised the RRR six times between 2010 and June 2011, up to an all-
time high of 21.5 per cent for major Chinese banks in June 2011. 
This measure has significantly reduced the available capital that banks 
can transform into loans. Clearly, Chinese authorities use prudential 
regulatory tools not merely to enhance the stability of the financial 
system but also for purposes of macroeconomic management (PBOC 
Research Institute 2012a; Zhang 2012). 
It is in this context that Basel III emerges as a desirable policy 
instrument. Adherence and even over-compliance with the new glob-
al standard enables the technocratic faction to lock in an important 
piece of prudential banking reform (Walter 2010). It also enables it to 
limit further credit expansion. Andrew Walter notes:  
Modest medium-term over-compliance with Basel capital stand-
ards can be justified as necessary compensations for the potential-
ly damaging domestic consequences of the post-GFC credit 
boom. (Walter 2014: 30)  
The external scrutiny provided by the Basel Committee’s peer-review 
process is expected to insulate China’s banks from political pressures 
for further reversion to policy lending in the event of a future crisis 
(Ju and Lo 2012). This is especially relevant under China’s “depend-
ent regulatory state model” (Yazar 2015), where financial supervisors 
are constrained by the political objectives of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Nölke expands upon this point, arguing that mock implemen-
tation of Basel III is meant to appease the generalist faction (Nölke 
2015). His assertion of mock implementation, however, is based 
more on suspicion than evidence, highlighting the relevance of the 
credibility gap China’s financial policymakers are facing abroad (see 
below). 
Both the PBOC and the State Council continue to favour a 
gradual liberalisation of the capital account, but the authorities are 
concerned that further opening and reform will increase risk and 
volatility in domestic financial markets (Xinhua 2013). Local experi-
ments in financial liberalisation, namely in the south-eastern city of 
Wenzhou, were shelved when they threatened to jeopardise social 
and political stability (Zeng 2015). Similarly, the stock market bubble 
and bust in 2015 challenged the authority and expertise of Beijing’s 
financial policymakers. A gradual, experimentalist approach has been 
widely celebrated as a key ingredient of China’s reform success, but it 
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faces structural obstacles in the area of financial liberalisation. The 
banking system, state-owned enterprises in key economic sectors, 
land management, and local government financing are entangled in a 
complex web of interdependence, especially in post-crisis China 
(Breslin 2014). Research has shown that local governments weigh 
political incentives against economic ones when determining how 
closely to follow Beijing’s orders in the implementation of regulatory 
policies (Van Aken and Lewis 2015). In the area of financial liberali-
sation, the repercussions of sub-standard implementation of national 
policies for national social and political stability are especially worri-
some. 
Figure 1. Interest Rates and Required Reserve Ratio for Commercial 
Banks in China (in %) 
Source: CBRC 2007. 
In the face of these challenges, several internal documents highlight 
the importance of prudential supervisory instruments as a means of 
stabilising the economy (PBOC Research Institute 2012a, 2012c; 
State Council Development Research Center 2013b, 2013d). Basel III 
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imposes limits on assets relative to equity on a bank’s balance sheet. 
As a complement to the loan-to-deposit and reserve requirement 
ratios that regulate the relationship between bank assets and liabilities, 
Basel III serves as an instrument for both microprudential and macro-
economic management purposes in the hands of China’s technocratic 
faction of policymakers.  
Stringent prudential regulation and financial repression does not 
come without unintended side effects, however. China is facing what 
Goodhart (2008) calls a “boundary problem.” Any tightening of pru-
dential requirements generates incentives to shift financial activities 
outside the regulatory perimeter to areas where regulation and super-
vision are weakest (IMF 2014).  
In an environment where depositors lack profitable investment 
opportunities and where small and medium businesses face severe 
credit constraints, the shadow banking system is burgeoning. Chinese 
households use wealth management products (WMP) increasingly as 
deposit substitutes, and corporate savings enter the financial market 
through a variety of trust products and other, even less transparent 
instruments. Data from the PBOC shows that shadow banking ac-
counts for 30 per cent of the CNY 17.3 trillion in credit issued in 
2013, up from 23 per cent in the previous year (Mitchell 2014). This 
massive credit expansion outside of regulatory control poses a chal-
lenge for both the central bank’s monetary policy and its financial 
stability objectives, as even top-level policymakers have recently ad-
mitted publicly (Bloomberg 2014; Zhang 2014). It does not affect 
compliance with Basel III, because the perimeter of Basel regulations 
is restricted to the formal banking sector. Nevertheless, the growth of 
the shadow banking sector shows that even gold-plated Basel III 
regulations cannot ensure – and may even be counterproductive for – 
monetary and financial stability (IMF 2016). 
Reputation and the Credibility Gap 
The reputational benefits of banking regulation were not a concern 
for China’s policymakers as long as the country’s financial system 
developed in an environment of sheltered autarky. In state-permeated 
capitalism in general and China’s system of financial repression in 
particular, banks are not designed to maximise profits or allocative 
efficiency; rather, they serve as infrastructure to channel capital to 
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productive purposes in line with the government’s development plan 
(Gruin 2013; Nölke 2015).  
China’s banks have grown fast in this comfortable domestic en-
vironment but have rarely expanded beyond the borders of the main-
land and Hong Kong (Weinland 2015). In order to successfully com-
pete in the financial sector abroad, Chinese banks need to rely on 
reputation. Their subsidiaries overseas need to attract deposits and 
secure cheap wholesale financing in capital markets, both of which 
require investor confidence. More fundamentally, they need to obtain 
a charter in order to operate in foreign jurisdictions. But how can 
Chinese banks build this reputation? 
Relying on its historical track record is not an option for Chinese 
banks, for two reasons: First, even though some Chinese banks were 
established as far back as 100 years ago, they ceased operating as 
companies under the planned economy of the People’s Republic. 
Only after Deng’s call to turn them back “into real banks” did Chi-
na’s banks resume operations, and even then financial intermediation 
was subject to heavy state intervention until the commercial bank law 
of 1995 was passed. In other words, most Chinese banks have less 
than 30 years of a track record. Second, to further complicate things, 
this track record is everything but confidence-inspiring. Due to low-
quality corporate governance, backwards risk management, and wide-
spread relationship and policy lending, big state-owned banks reached 
the point of technical bankruptcy in 1998 and again in 2003. Both 
times, banks had to be bailed out and undergo restructuring under 
the supervision of state authorities. The latest recapitalisation of a 
bank using foreign exchange reserves occurred as recently as 2008 
(IMF 2011). Foreign observers who believed that banks had gained 
some autonomy from the state were disappointed by the massive loan 
expansion under the 2009 stimulus package (Borst and Lardy 2015; 
Goodstadt 2011).  
Adherence to purely domestic regulatory standards would not 
inspire investor confidence either. For example, Chinese regulators 
introduced a three-tiered system to measure non-performing loans 
(NPL) in 1995 that fell short of international standards. Even though 
the PBOC overhauled the loan classification system in 2002, suspi-
cion among foreign regulators and market participants has not sub-
sided (Borst 2013). Moreover, domestic prudential supervision lacks 
credibility because the state has a double role as a regulator of the 
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banks on the one side, and as the majority shareholder on the other. 
Under these circumstances, verifiable adherence to international pru-
dential banking standards serves as one of the few sources of reputa-
tion available to Chinese banks.  
In a recent interview, a US banking regulator explained the rea-
soning behind China’s external credibility gap: 
It’s very hard to compare China to other economies because 
there’s so many of their firms that, still, if they’re not state-owned, 
they’re very closely owned by the state. I don’t think that there is a 
high degree of confidence in the data from China. I don’t think 
you can believe their non-performing numbers are as good as they 
say they are. I don’t have any personal experience, but I don’t 
know of anyone who doesn’t view Chinese data with a great de-
gree of scepticism. (Anonymous 1 2014) 
This lack of confidence poses a real obstacle for the expansion of 
Chinese banks in the United States and other developed countries. 
Asked about the relationship with US banking authorities, a Chinese 
regulator states:  
When the Chinese banks would want to open a branch in the 
States, for quite a long time the US regulators didn’t agree, saying 
that you have a poor regulation. […] We negotiate with the Fed-
eral Reserve to push them open to Chinese banks. (Anonymous 2 
2013) 
A survey conducted by Cai and Wheale (2007) shows that reputation-
al concerns are indeed among the reasons why Chinese bank man-
agers worked towards compliance with Basel II before 2008. Ironical-
ly, the series of bank failures at the heart of the global financial crisis 
exposed the inadequacy of these standards. However, the Basel 
Committee made considerable efforts to incorporate lessons learned 
from the crisis in its overhaul of global banking standards. The new 
Basel III standards with tougher requirements and a more rigorous 
peer-review mechanism serve as a quality seal for Chinese banks that 
no domestic institution could provide. 
This article is unable to provide an objective assessment of the 
capability of Chinese financial stakeholders to “cook the books” in 
order to avoid domestic or transnational scrutiny. But in this context 
of uncertainty, mere compliance with Basel III is arguably not enough 
to address the credibility gap. By over-complying with the new global 
standards, Chinese banks can expect to overcome resistance by for-
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eign regulators. Furthermore, banks that are able to fulfil or even 
exceed Basel requirements can count on favourable treatment in in-
ternational capital markets. Therefore, the adjustment costs of adher-
ence to Basel III are outweighed by the benefits these standards con-
fer to China’s major banks as they pursue outward expansion in the 
future.  
China’s biggest commercial bank, ICBC, may be most suited to 
illustrate this phenomenon. The bank took some preliminary steps 
overseas by acquiring minority stakes in Standard Bank (South Africa) 
in 2007 and ACL Bank (Thailand) in 2009, and by buying the broker-
dealer operations of Fortis Securities in the United States one year 
later. More recently, ICBC purchased majority shares of banks in 
Canada in 2010 and Argentina in 2012 and converted them into its 
first foreign subsidiaries (Berger, Hasan, and Zhou 2010; Martin 
2014). A bid to take over the US branches of the Hong Kong-based 
Bank of East Asia in 2011, however, was blocked by the Federal Re-
serve on the basis of prudential regulatory concerns (Thomas and 
Guerrera 2011). In the summer of 2012, however, at a time when the 
CBRC issued super-equivalent Basel III standards and three years 
after China joined the Basel Committee, US regulators revised their 
decision and authorised ICBC’s acquisition. Since then, the bank has 
operated a subsidiary insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) in the United States under a federal charter. ICBC’s 
regulatory reports to the US authorities highlight the growing stock 
of Tier 1 capital in accordance with the Basel III specifications issued 
by the CBRC (ICBC 2013, 2014). 
In terms of international presence, ICBC is the most advanced 
of China’s commercial banks. Its peers can be expected to follow in 
the upcoming years. Over the last decade, Beijing has made important 
steps in extending foreign loans and other “financial inducements” 
(Wu and Wei 2014) abroad, but the channels of cross-border financial 
expansion were policy banks and sovereign wealth funds, not the 
commercial banks (Mattlin and Nojonen 2015). At a time when rising 
unit labour costs are pushing Chinese companies to venture abroad 
and gradual capital account liberalisation is providing Chinese house-
holds with a growing range of offshore investment opportunities, 
commercial banks have every incentive to accumulate international 
experience and expand their financial services across borders. 
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But over-compliance with Basel III not only provides China’s 
commercial banks with a credible external quality seal, it also helps 
regulators attain prestige in a major financial standard-setting body. 
In 2008, G8 leaders decided to incorporate emerging market eco-
nomies into the exclusive clubs of global financial governance. They 
elevated the G20 to the prime forum to coordinate responses to the 
global financial crisis, and extended membership to the Financial 
Stability Board, the Basel Committee, and other government net-
works to selected developing countries, including China (Collins and 
Gottwald 2014). Leading Chinese policy figures welcomed this devel-
opment, emphasising that in order to protect its domestic interests, 
China must have a voice in the international financial market and the 
supervisory bodies that regulate it (State Council Development Re-
search Center 2013d, 2013c; Yi 2009; Zhou 2012). 
In the wake of the crisis, China has called for and achieved some 
degree of governance reform in the IMF and the World Bank in 
order to give a greater voice to itself and other emerging economies 
(Ferdinand and Wang 2013; Wade 2011). The politics of influence in 
transnational government networks, however, are more complicated 
than those of the big international financial institutions. In principle, 
all members of standard-setting bodies such as the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) are on equal standing, and decisions 
are made by consensus. In the absence of formal voting shares, voice 
is bestowed upon member countries according to their market size 
and legitimacy. The precondition for legitimacy, in turn, is compli-
ance with the financial standards promoted by the government 
network itself. Because China’s share of global financial markets is 
still negligible (Hong Kong is a separate member of the standard-
setting bodies), legitimacy through compliance – or, in fact, over-
compliance – is the only way for China to attain a voice in these 
government networks.  
Beijing’s intentions to engage in gold-plating Basel in order to 
become a respected stakeholder in the international regulatory com-
munity do not go unnoticed. A regulator from Hong Kong states: 
China is keen on innovating domestic standards up to internation-
al standards at a fast pace in order to catch up with the interna-
tional development. […] I think they have a case to be keen on 
implementing those international standards domestically to be 
treated more seriously than other developing jurisdictions in order 
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to gain [a position for] the country as a major player in interna-
tional forums. (Anonymous 3 2013) 
As mentioned above, China’s banks suffer from a reputational deficit 
due to a short and less-than-stellar track record. The same can be said 
for China’s regulatory authorities. Especially in the realm of financial 
regulation, China is a latecomer in institutional development (Brehm 
2008; He 2013; Heilmann 2005; Pearson 2007). Hence, over-compli-
ance with a global standard is a costly but necessary signal to China’s 
peers in the global regulatory community. When asked about the 
main motivation for the massive regulatory upgrade that gold-plating 
Basel III implies, a Chinese regulator responded: “It’s international. 
Well, you see the foreign regulators went kind of, ‘Okay, the Chinese 
regulators really made a lot of progress.’” (Anonymous 2 2013). 
It is important to recognise, though, that the phenomenon de-
scribed above does not extend to all areas of financial regulatory re-
form. The initiative by the G20 and the FSB (2011) to bring the 
shadow banking system under regulatory control, for example, has 
not been received by Beijing with enthusiasm. Chinese scholars and 
policymakers have made an effort to show why international efforts 
to strengthen regulation are not compatible with the domestic situa-
tion (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 2013; State Council Devel-
opment Research Center 2013a; Zeng 2013). A thorough examination 
of the sectoral differences in Chinese financial regulatory conver-
gence with international standards is beyond the scope of this article, 
but a preliminary analysis indicates that the costs of adjustment would 
be high for China and the benefits to the country’s external reputa-
tion low. This incentive structure is likely to give veto players in the 
domestic political economy the upper hand over change agents. 
Therefore, even though the dramatic expansion of the shadow bank-
ing system in China interferes with conventional macroeconomic 
policy (PBOC Research Institute 2012d, 2013b, 2013a), we are un-
likely to see China gold-plating the emerging international standards 
of shadow banking regulation. 
Conclusion 
China’s current behaviour in the realm of banking regulation provides 
only one data point, which is insufficient to validate or disprove any 
theory of global regulatory politics. Nevertheless, the case of Basel III 
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implementation in China can help us to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of salient theories in the current literature. 
As the above study shows, Drezner’s (2007) point about the im-
portance of adjustment costs to global regulation is well taken. Be-
cause of the timing and scope of domestic banking reform, Chinese 
banks face much lower adjustment costs.  
At the same time, the Chinese example shows how difficult it is 
to establish a direct causal link between market size and the balance 
between adjustment costs and benefits. Drezner (2010) predicted that 
China as a major power would lack the incentive to converge with 
international regulatory standards, yet in the case of Basel III China is 
making more of an effort to comply and over-comply than most 
other jurisdictions.  
What historical institutionalists can take from the Chinese case is 
not only support for their arguments, but also rich material for fur-
ther theory development. Several of the reasons why adjustment 
costs for Chinese banks are relatively low are clearly linked to the 
domestic institutional arrangement. Established commercial banks in 
China could count on a privileged source of income and thrive in a 
protected environment that has been created by public authorities. 
Above all, this study highlights the importance of reputation as a 
driving force. More than merely an auxiliary to socialisation that is 
embedded in what constructivists call the logic of appropriateness, 
reputation is an asset with clear economic benefits, at least in the 
world of financial regulation. Kahler (2013) correctly points out that 
the capabilities of rising powers in the ongoing bargain with incum-
bents rest not only on market size but also on a credible commitment 
to predominant liberal standards. 
In China’s case, banks need reputation to expand abroad, and 
regulators need reputation in order to enhance their negotiating posi-
tion both internationally and domestically. Thus, in the search for 
international reputation, the interests of banks and regulators are 
aligned. In addition, global banking standards represent an important 
opportunity for the technocratic faction of China’s policymaking elite 
to lock in and insulate prudential banking reform from reversion due 
to political pressures. It is this peculiar convergence of outward-
oriented incentives and domestic conditions on both the state and 
industry side that helps explain why China is in the process of gold-
plating Basel III banking standards. 
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An important limitation of this study is that it cannot make in-
ferences regarding the stability of the Chinese financial system. The 
reason is not that China would emulate its neighbours’ exercise in 
“mock compliance” with global financial standards (Walter 2008). 
Enhanced peer-review mechanisms under the auspices of the G20 
and the IMF reduce the room to manoeuvre in terms of domestic 
regulatory finagling. Moreover, China’s accounting standards have 
substantially converged with International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing since 2005, and 
all stock-listed companies have to meet international accounting and 
auditing requirements, even though compliance rates have risen only 
in the last few years (IMF 2011; Taplin, Zhao, and Brown 2014).  
Rather, the reason inferences regarding financial stability cannot 
be made is that the new global regulatory standards themselves may 
be of limited effectiveness. Believing that compliance with or even 
gold-plating of Basel III will protect China from the next financial 
crisis may be just as naïve as thinking the same of Basel II in the 
United Kingdom in 2007. Even though the Chinese financial system 
withstood a series of stress-test simulations as part of the 2011 Fi-
nancial System Stability Assessment, the country is facing massive 
challenges that range from reducing local government debt (Shih 
2008) to internal rebalancing after years of debt-fuelled overinvest-
ment (Pettis 2013). Basel III does not effectively address these vul-
nerabilities, and a conservative implementation of its standards might 
even have the perverse effect of contributing to the concentration of 
systemic risk outside of its regulatory perimeter, in the shadow bank-
ing sector (Elliott and Qiao 2015). The next steps of market-oriented 
reform and opening to global capital flows are leading China’s policy-
makers into unchartered and risky territory where a Basel gold-plate 
cannot guarantee protection, no matter what karat. 
Further research might look beyond the realm of financial regu-
lation to discover the conditions under which emerging powers such 
as China exceed global standards. Ren (2012) argues that China is 
taking conscious steps to signal a non-revisionist stance in the G20 
while pushing for reform within the existing order. Over-compliance 
with global standards might also endow rising powers with reputa-
tional benefits in areas other than trade and finance. China’s signifi-
cant contribution to peacekeeping troops under the aegis of the Unit-
ed Nations might be a case in point (Huang 2011). A cross-sectoral 
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integration of research is needed to develop a theoretically rooted and 
empirically sound understanding of China’s integration into the liber-
al world order. 
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